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Abstract. A series of recent studies analyze the impact of financial 
crisis on the fiscal soundness in the Euro area countries. Even if their 
documented results present the transmission mechanisms of the financial 
instability toward the fiscal sector, a more realistic problem is related to 
the contribution of the fiscal and budgetary disequilibrium to the 
financial instability propagation. In this line, we show, based on a simple 
econometric model, that, beside the expansionary monetary policy, the 
budgetary deficit conducts to the financial stability deterioration. The 
financial stability of the Euro area is measured based on an aggregate 
financial stability index, constructed by employing the IMF methodology 
used for the financial stress index. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Once the sovereign debt crisis made its appearance in the Euro area, 
several economists have associated the deterioration of the public finances 
situation with the global financial crisis. And this link can not be neglected (see 
the situation of the Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, so called PIGS 
countries). The transmission mechanisms of the financial instability toward the 
fiscal sector are complex. The financial crisis can influence the fiscal sector in 
different ways. First, the fiscal balance deteriorates due to a decrease in tax 
revenue resulting from the economic recession and due to an increase in the 
government expenditures in order to stimulate economic activities. Second, the 
government debt increases because the governments, in order to save troubled 
financial institutions and overcoming financial crisis, make appeal to public 
bonds. In this line, Schuknecht et al. (2011) speak about an unpunctual 
reformation of the Stability and Growth Pact, associated with the lake of fiscal 
policy coordination. 
It is true that a crisis has a negative impact on the fiscal sector, but is also 
true that we had a crisis because the fiscal policy and monetary policy 
coordination was very poor. That is why, a more realistic problem is related to 
the contribution of the fiscal and budgetary disequilibrium to the financial 
instability propagation. In this line, we show, based on a simple econometric 
model, that beside the expansionary monetary policy, the budgetary deficit 
conducts to a financial stability deterioration. The financial stability of the Euro 
area is measured based on an aggregate financial stability index, constructed by 
employing the IMF methodology used for the construction of the financial 
stress index. Our results show that the financial stability is correlated with the 
other objectives of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the national 
governments in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Consequently, in order 
to avoid a new crisis appearance, it is necessary to have a better coordination 
between the ECB and the national governments. This coordination can be 
achieved by considering financial stability as a common objective. The 
authorities’ cooperation is also supported by different financial stability 
committees that have been lately created. 
The reminder of the paper is the following: section 1 presents the reform 
of the financial stability framework in EMU, describing the structure of the 
financial stability committees that have been created at national level; section 2 
presents the aggregate financial stability index construction and the econometric 
test, highlighting the relationship between the financial stability and the others 
authorities’ objectives; the last section concludes. 
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1. A reform of the financial stability framework in EMU 
 
The recent economic crisis put into discussion the economic policies 
coordination mechanism inside a monetary area. The policy mix literature, 
related to the fiscal and monetary coordination, does not look answers in terms 
of financial stability. Even if a lot of studies (see Beetsma et al., 2001, Laskar, 
2003, Oros, 2008) show that the budgetary coordination is necessary for the 
reduction of asymmetric chocks impact at EMU level, none of these works 
analyzes the close relation which exist between the macroeconomic 
stabilization and the systemic financial stability. 
The disequilibrium which appears in the real activity has a spillover effect 
toward the financial system and the public authorities (central banks and 
governments) are forced to make an intervention strategy. In the Euro area, 
during the recent economic crisis, the ECB and the national governments have 
taken repeated measures in order to stabilize the financial activity. At the 
beginning, the interventions were represented by the liquidity injections in the 
market – lender of last resort actions. Afterwards, an ample reform of the 
institutional framework for regulation and supervision was made.  
In this context, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was 
created by the Euro area Member States following the decisions taken on 9 May 
2010 within the framework of the Ecofin Council. The EFSF’s mandate is to 
safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to Euro 
area member states. EFSF is authorized to use the following instruments linked 
to appropriate conditionality: loans to countries in financial difficulties, 
interventions in the debt primary and secondary markets and finance 
recapitalizations of financial institutions through loans to governments. 
In the same time, the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) 
was created. The establishment of the ESFS is associated with a complicated 
network of regulatory and supervisory institutions. His objectives are to 
facilitate cooperation among EU and national supervisors. In the same spirit, on 
1 January 2011, the three ESAs were created: the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).  
Beside the development of the regulation and supervision institutional 
structure at EU level, even before the crisis burst-up, different cooperation 
mechanisms in terms of financial stability was putted into place in several 
European countries. Financial Stability Committees were created in order to 
facilitate the cooperation between central banks, national supervision agencies 
and national governments, in terms of financial stability (Table 1). Claudiu Tiberiu Albulescu 
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As we have saw, the cooperation between authorities in terms of financial 
stability was improved. However, it is difficult to state that these frameworks 
are efficient and can achieve only by themselves the Euro area financial system 
stability. They can have an important contribution in terms of stability, but it is 
more useful to declare the financial stability as a common objective of the 
authorities, in order to intensify their efforts in this direction. Furthermore, in 
this case we do not speak only about a cooperation strategy; we speak about a 
coordination framework. In the next section we will demonstrate that the 
financial stability objective is compatible with the others objectives of the ECB 
(prices stability) and national governments (growth and budgetary equilibrium), 
and this coordination framework can be established. 
 
Table 1 
Financial stability committees    
Country  Establishment 
date  Name Composition 
Spain 2006  Financial  Stability 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agencies 
- Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Czech 
Republic 
2006 Financial  Market 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Ministry of Finance 
- Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies 
Romania 2007  National 
Committee for 
Financial Stability 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agencies 
- Ministry of Finance 
Portugal 2007  National  Financial 
Stability 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agencies 
- Ministry of Finance and Public Administration 
Austria 2008  Financial  Market 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agencies 
- Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Poland 2008  Financial  Stability 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agency  
- Ministry of Finance 
Italy 2008  Financial  Stability 
Safeguard 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agencies 
- Public Treasury 
Greece 2008  Financial  Stability 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agencies 
- Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Finland 2008  Memoranda  of 
Understanding 
(MoU) 
- EU and central banks from Nordic countries  
- Supervisory authorities 
- Ministries of finance 
Denmark  2008  Danish Act on 
Financial Stability 
- Government 
- Parliament 
- Banking association  
World-
Europe 
2009 Financial  Stability 
Board  
- Central banks 
- Financial supervision agencies and national 
governments Financial stability, monetary policy and budgetary coordination in EMU  
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Country  Establishment 
date  Name Composition 
- International institutions 
Hungary 2010  Financial  Stability 
Board 
- Ministry of Finance 
- Central bank 
- Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
Belgium 2010  Committee  for 
Systemic Risks 
and System-
relevant Financial 
Institutions 
- Central bank 
- Banking, Finance, and Insurance Commission 
- Ministry of Finance 
France 2011  Financial 
Regulation and 
Systemic Risk 
Council   
- Central bank 
- Public Treasury  
- Financial supervision agencies 
- Ministry of Economy 
England 2011  Financial  Policy 
Committee 
- Central bank 
- Financial Services Authority  
Sweden 2011  Financial  stability 
cooperation 
arrangements 
- Central bank 
- Financial supervision agency 
- Ministry of Finance 
- National Debt Office 
Source: Internet site of central banks, ministries of finances, supervision authorities, 
Financial Stability Board and International Monetary Fund.  
 
 
2. Financial stability as a common objective for ECB and national 
governments 
 
2.1. The construction of the Euro area aggregate financial stability index  
 
The main advantage of such an index, called stability or stress index, 
depending on its construction method, resides in the fact that it represents a 
dynamic analysis of the financial stability level. It was developed in studies like 
those of Illing and Liu (2003), Nelson and Perli (2005), Gersl and Hemanek 
(2006), Cihák (2007), Rouabah (2007) or Albulescu (2010) and it became more 
popular when it was used by the IMF in 2008 or by the ECB in 2010, in the 
case of the financial stress index. Such an index can be constructed in different 
ways. Most of the existing stress indexes are based on high-frequency data, but 
they differ in the selected variables (banks capitalization, credit ratings, credit 
growth, interest rate spreads or volatility of different asset classes), country 
coverage and aggregation method. An important advantage of continuous stress 
indicators (or financial instability indicators) is that they may reveal periods of 
small-scale stress that did not result in full-blown crisis and were neglected in 
studies based on binary crisis variables. Claudiu Tiberiu Albulescu 
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No matter the employed technique, there are few steps that should be 
followed in the construction of the aggregate financial instability index. After 
the indicators are defined, they have to be quantified. The accuracy level and 
the measurement scale have to be established. It often happens that the 
individual indicators do not have the same accuracy or the same measurement 
units, situation which is obviously complicating the aggregation into a synthetic 
index. The indicators’ values have thus to be normalized (different 
normalization methods can be used). Even if the normalization and the 
aggregation methods raise important theoretical and practical problems, the 
major inconvenient relates to the indicators weighting. We can choose either to 
give the same importance to all the variables or to apply a different weight 
based on the decision making criteria. The standard procedure consists in giving 
the same weight to all the variables which are included in the aggregate index. 
The use of a composite index has a number of benefits (Baxa et al., 2011). 
First, it approximates the evolution of the financial stress caused by different 
factors and thus it is not limited to one specific type of instability. Second, the 
inclusion of additional variables into the instability or stress index does not 
affect the evolution of the indicator. Third, the composition of the indicator 
allows breaking down the reactions of the central bank with respect to different 
stress sub-components. 
In this study, in the first phase of the index construction demarche, we 
have identified the individual indicators, which are calculated on a quarterly 
basis covering the period 1999: Q1 to 2011: Q1. The 10 financial instability 
indicators, employed in different research papers on this subject, are presented 
in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Financial instability indicators 
Individual indicators  Expected contribution to 
the financial instability  Database 
Financial market instability index (FMII) 
Volatility of the stock index return  +  Yahoo finance  
Short term interest rate volatility  +  OECD and Eurostat 
Economic sentiment indicator  -  European Commission 
Banks’ financial soundness index (BFSI) 
Bank nonperforming loans to total loans   +  OECD and IMF 
Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets    -  OECD and IMF 
ROE   -  OECD and IMF 
Liquid assets to total assets   -  OECD and IMF 
Interest rate spread: three-month Euribor rate – 
ECB monetary key rate  in t-1  + Eurostat  and  ECB 
External financial vulnerability index (EFVI) 
REER excessive depreciation or appreciation   +  Eurostat 
Current account deficit to GDP   +  OECD and Eurostat Financial stability, monetary policy and budgetary coordination in EMU  
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Because we want to retain the IMF normalization procedure (see FMI, 
2008), we are forced to construct an instability index (AFII), and afterwards an 
aggregate financial stability index (AFSI) as its opposite. The AFII takes values 
in the interval [1;10] where 10 represents a high level of financial stress. 
Consequently, the AFSI retained in our study is the difference between the 
maximum value which can be registered by the AFII and its real value. In this 
case, a high value of the AFSI is associated with a satisfactory level of financial 
stability. 
As we can see in Table 2, the impact of the individual indicators on the 
financial instability can be either positive or negative. In order to use the IMF 
normalization procedure, we have retained the indicators with a positive 
contribution and we have transformed the others using their inverse value (e.g. 
for the indicator “I”: 1/I or 100-I). In this way, all the indicators will have a 
positive contribution to instability (a high level of the indicators points out a 
high instability). 
The normalization procedure for each indicator (and for all the EMU 
members) is based on the formula: 
t
t i
in
X X
X

_

          ( 1 )  
where: Xin – is the normalized value of the X indicator, for the i quarter ;  t
_
X  
represents the average value of the indicator X during the period t and σt is the 
indicator X standard deviation during the period t. 
 
After the computation of the normalized values, we have calculated the 
partial index (FMII, BFSI and EFVI – see Table 2 above), using the arithmetic 
mean of the individual indicators incorporated in each index. Finally, the AFII 
is obtained for each Euro area country, based on the formula: 
 
10
2 5 3 iz iz iz
iz
EFVI BFSI FMII
AFII
    
      ( 2 )  
where: AFIIiz is the aggregate financial instability index for the country z in the 
i quarter.  
 
Calculated in this manner, the AFII values can be positive or negative. 
That is why, in order to have a clear picture of the AFII dynamics, it is 
necessary to use a rescaling method for repositioning the index values in an one 
interval ([1;100]), as for example that of the IMF, or in another interval that we Claudiu Tiberiu Albulescu 
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have chosen by ourselves ([1;10]), where we usually find the values of the 
indicators introduced later in the econometric analysis. 
 
 

10
.... , , min( ) max(
.... , , min(
3 2 1
3 2 1 



in in in tz
in in in iz
izr X X X abs AFII
X X X abs AFII
AFII    (3) 
where: AFIIizr is the aggregate financial instability index, rescaled, for the 
country z in the i quarter; AFIItz is the aggregate financial instability index, for 
the country z in the t period (1999: Q1 to 2011: Q1) and Xin1 are the normalized 
values of the individual instability indicators, for each period taken into 
consideration.  
 
The last step is represented by the construction of the AFII for the 
Eurozone. The AFII for each country was weighted with the country GDP to 
Euro area GDP ratio (a weighted mean was then calculated, based on the 
importance of each country in the Euro area GDP). This choice was made due 
to the fact that the governments of big countries, like Germany or France, have 
an important influence in the EU structures and that the ECB decisions are 
different if the financial systems of large countries become instable. However, 
we reached the conclusion that the results obtained with the weighted mean and 
with the arithmetic mean do not differ significantly.   
 


 
17
1 z iEUR
iz
izr iEUR GDP
GDP
AFII AFII        ( 4 )  
where: AFIIiEUR is the Euro zone aggregate instability index for the quarter i; 
GDPiz is the GDP of the country z for the quarter i and  GDPiEUR is the GDP of 
the  Euro area for the quarter i. 
 
Finally, we have estimated, like we have mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, an aggregate financial stability index, based on the aggregate 
instability index for the Euro area (AFSIiEUR = 10 - AFIIiEUR). Its trend is 
presented in Figure 1 below, where a high level of financial stability is 
associated with a high score of the AFSI and the opposite case: 
 Financial stability, monetary policy and budgetary coordination in EMU  
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Figure 1. Euro area financial stability index dynamics 
 
 
2.2. Compatibility of the authorities’ objectives: an econometric analysis  
 
In this section we have tested the link between financial stability 
(measured based on an aggregate index) and the other objectives of the 
authorities (national governments and central banks), namely: the economic 
growth rate, the inflation rate, the interest rate smoothing and the budgetary 
deficit. The description of the explanatory variables is made in the Table 3, 
below. 
 
Table 3  
Description of the explanatory variables and expected sign  
Indicators Description Database  Expected 
sign  Explanations 
GDP Economic  growth 
rate (quarterly basis, 
compared to the 
same period of the 
previous year) 
Eurostat  +  The economic growth rate has a positive 
impact on the financial stability. An 
important number of financial crisis appear 
due to the deterioration of the real economy 
situation.   
Inflation  The inflation rate 
(quarterly basis, 
compared to the 
same period of the 
previous year)  
Eurostat 
and OECD 
(starting 
with 
2003:Q2) 
+  As a rule, a general increase in consumer’s 
prices is associated with a higher demand 
on the market. This higher demand is 
supported by an economic growth and by a 
financial stability period. In this case, we 
assist to a sort of short term trade-off 
between financial stability and prices 
stability, in relation with the central banks’ 
objectives.  
Euribor Euribor  at  three 
months (a proxy for 
the key interest rate 
ECB  -  A decrease in the interest rate entails 
benefits for the financial stability in terms of 
credit activity reprisal. The burst-up of crisis Claudiu Tiberiu Albulescu 
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Indicators Description Database  Expected 
sign  Explanations 
- which has a weak 
dynamic) – the 
average of the 
period  (quarter) 
episodes is accompanied by a high level of 
the interest rate, associated with the risk on 
the market. Indeed, the authorities make 
efforts in order to solve liquidity problems 
and to stimulate the economic growth 
towards the decrease of the interest rate, 
even if an inflationary pressure appears on 
short run. This behaviour favours the 
financial stability.  
Deficit Budgetary  deficit, 
(calculated as the 
difference between 
public expenses and 
budgetary incomes)  
ECB  -  An important public deficit has a negative 
influence on the investors’ perception and, 
as a result, on the financial stability. Even if 
it is hard to demonstrate that a higher deficit 
produces a deterioration of the financial 
system stability in an automatic manner, we 
can observe that, at the beginning of the 
crisis periods, the budgetary deficit is 
important.  
 
The tested equation is the following (in brackets we have the t-statistic 
values and the associated p-values): 
 
t
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
DEFICIT . EURIBOR . INFLATION . GDP . . AFSI       


 




 




 

 

 

 

 


 098 0
69 1
001 0
34 3
012 0
61 2
003 0
13 3
0001 0
73 5
10 0 37 0 37 0 16 0 84 2  (5) 
 
R
2=0.40; F=7.43 (p<0.0001) 
 
The results show that the expected sign of the coefficients are obtained 
and all these coefficients prove significant. The economic growth and the 
interest rate have, as expected, the most significant impact on financial stability. 
Due to this link between the financial stability and the other objectives of the 
authorities, we can state that the financial stability must be considered as a 
common and declared objective of the ECB and of the national governments in 
the Euro area countries. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The financial crisis has confirmed the fact that the cooperation 
mechanisms in terms of financial stability, established at the EMU level, were 
not efficient. The authorities’ interventions in order to save the financial 
systems had a negative impact in terms of fiscal soundness and credibility. The 
institutional regulation framework was improved but it is necessary to have not Financial stability, monetary policy and budgetary coordination in EMU  
 
95
only cooperation but coordination of the ECB and national governments 
actions, in order to achieve the financial system stability. 
The policy-mix literature focused on the coordination problems in the 
EMU, but the financial stability objective was not taken into account, as a 
solution for empower this coordination. In this context and based on the effort 
made on the institutional side, we sustain the idea according to which the 
financial crisis can be avoided if the financial stability became de facto and de 
jure a common objective of the ECB and of the national governments. 
In order to support this idea, we have used a complex and documented 
methodology for the construction of a financial stability aggregate index for the 
Euro area. Afterwards, we have demonstrated the existence of a strong 
compatibility between the stability objective and the others declared and 
stipulated objectives of the authorities, namely the economic growth, the price 
stability, the interest rate smoothing and the budgetary soundness (a short term 
trade-off appears in terms of prices stability). Our econometric test results 
indicate the necessity to consider the financial stability as a common objective 
at EMU level. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This work was supported by the project “Post-Doctoral Studies in 
Economics: training program for elite researchers – SPODE” co-funded from 
the European Social Fund through the Development of Human Resources 
Operational Programme 2007-2013, contract no. POSDRU/89/1.5/S/61755. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Albulescu, C.T. (2010). “Forecasting the Romanian Financial System Stability Using a 
Stochastic Simulation Model”, Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting, 13(1),   
pp. 81-98 
Baxa, J., Horváth, R., Vašícek, B. (2011). “Time-Varying Monetary-Policy Rules and Financial 
Stress: Does Financial Instability Matter for Monetary Policy?”, Czech National Bank 
Working Paper, No. 3 
Beetsma R., Debrun X., Klaassen F. (2001). “Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU 
Desirable?”, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 3035 
Gersl, A., Hermanek, J. (2006). “Financial Stability Indicators: Advantages and Disadvantages 
of their Use in the Assessment of the Financial System Stability”, Czech National Bank 
Financial Stability Report 
Illing, M., Liu, Y. (2003). “An index of Financial Stress for Canada”, National Bank of Canada 
Working Papers, No. 14 Claudiu Tiberiu Albulescu 
 
96 
Laskar, D. (2003). “Policy-mix: le besoin de coordination des politiques budgétaires entre pays 
est-il accru en union monétaire?”, Louvain Economic Review, 69(3), pp. 267-291 
Nelson, W.R., Perli, R. (2005). “Selected Indicators of Financial Stability”, Fourth Joint 
Central Bank Research Conference, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, 8 Noiembrie 
Oros, C. (2008). “Macroeconomic Stabilization in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union: Some 
Insights into the Effects of Fiscal Policy Coordination”, Economics Bulletin, 5(34),   
pp. 1-12 
Rouabah, A. (2007). “Mesure de la vulnérabilité du secteur bancaire luxembourgeois”, 
Luxembourg Central Bank Working Paper, No. 24 
Schuknecht, L., Moutot, P., Rother, P., Stark, J. (2011). “The Stability and Growth Pact crisis 
and reform”, ECB Occasional Papers Series, No. 129 